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On the Matrix-Free Generation of Adversarial
Perturbations for Black-Box Attacks
Hisaichi Shibata, Shouhei Hanaoka, Yukihiro Nomura, Naoto Hayashi, and Osamu Abe
Abstract—In general, adversarial perturbations superimposed
on inputs are realistic threats for a deep neural network (DNN).
In this paper, we propose a practical generation method of
such adversarial perturbation to be applied to black-box attacks
that demand access to an input-output relationship only. Thus,
the attackers generate such perturbation without invoking inner
functions and/or accessing the inner states of a DNN. Unlike
the earlier studies, the algorithm to generate the perturbation
presented in this study requires much fewer query trials. More-
over, to show the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbation
extracted, we experiment with a DNN for semantic segmentation.
The result shows that the network is easily deceived with the
perturbation generated than using uniformly distributed random
noise with the same magnitude.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack, Black-box attacks, Deep
learning, Perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) againsta carefully generated small noise disturbance, i.e., adver-
sarial perturbation, superimposed on input data, is a common
threat to be prevented [1], [2], [3]. The DNNs falsely recognize
the input data contaminated with such perturbation and it leads
to mislabeling, mis-segmentation of medical images [4] as well
as road signs [5], and pedestrians [6]. Consequently, this prob-
lem greatly affects the reliability of most systems developed
using DNNs, which are suitable for critical applications such
as medical imaging, autonomous car, and so on.
Randomly generated perturbations superimposed on an in-
put for a DNN are likely to be attenuated inside the DNN
and do not have a significant effect on an output when the
magnitude of the perturbation is low. As shown in Fig. 1,
inputted perturbation, which penetrates a DNN, and appears
in the output of the DNN is, considered to be a particular
threat even when the magnitude of the perturbation is the same.
Thus, it is challenging to prevent such noise from outputting
erroneous results. In this study, we show the existence of
such perturbations mathematically. The present study aims
at seeking such input perturbation whose magnitude is not
attenuated but amplified and then penetrates a DNN without
knowing the inner states of the DNN.
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Fig. 1. The concept of the adversarial perturbation generated in the present
study; f represents an input-output relationship of a DNN; the perturbation
superimposed on a base input is directly outputted on being superimposed on
a base output.
Compared with previous studies, our method has a sin-
gularly distinct combination of characteristics valuable for
attackers as follows:
• Black-Box Attack – The proposed method does not use
the inner state of the DNNs as in white-box attacks,
such as the utilization of a backpropagation [1], and
monitoring inner layer variables [7], but only request an
input-output relationship, i.e., an oracle.
• Query Efficient – The previous methods require lots of
black-box evaluation when limited to black-box attacks,
and its computational cost is typically O (h · w) where h
and w represent the height and width of input images,
respectively. However, the proposed method achieves
O (1) complexity.
• Memory Efficient – Unlike other gradient methods ap-
plied in white-box attacks in which the construction of
the Jacobian matrix is explicitly required, the proposed
method requires an implicit expression of the matrix only,
which reduces the memory requirements to O (h · w)
from O
(
h2 · w2
)
.
• Generality – The proposed method does not assume
components of an input vector for DNNs; hence, the
method can be applied to DNNs for voice, text, and video
recognition, other than image processing only.
II. RELATED WORKS
There are three streams of research for the generation of
adversarial perturbation. The first one is white-box attacks [1].
In white-box attacks, the inner states of the DNNs must be
visible and/or the inner application programming interfaces
(APIs) of the DNNs (e.g., a function to compute gradients
of any output vector using backpropagation technique), must
be accessible from attackers (see Fig. 2(a)). Next, the second
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Fig. 2. Definitions of white-box, black-box with an oracle, and no-box model;
in the black-box with an oracle, input-output relationship is only available and
the inner states of a DNN are completely concealed.
one is the black-box attacks [8], [9], [10], [11]. In black-box
attacks, there is no access permission for those in white-box
attacks but an oracle only (see Fig. 2(b)). Further, the last
one is the no-box attacks [6], [7], [11], which supports the
DNNs attack where the oracle is not reachable (see Fig. 2(c)).
In this case, attackers design perturbations, which have a
universal impact on several DNNs. Note that the research
works investigated in this section are limited to black-box
attacks since the present study focuses only on black-box
attacks, which is considered to be the most realistic situation
for attacks against the DNNs.
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF RELATED WORKS WITH ORACLE EVALUATION.
Method Number of oracle evaluation Memory requirement
Present(ours) O(1) O(h · w)
One pixel [8] O(h · w) O(h · w)
ZOO [9] O(h · w) O(h2 · w2)
Table I summarizes the computational complexity for oracle
evaluation and memory requirement needed to execute algo-
rithms for three different black-box attacks based on oracle
evaluation.
One-pixel attack [8] only adds perturbation onto one pixel
in an input image, and the perturbation is optimized using the
concept of differential evolution. Note that in a classification
problem introduced in [8], the dimension of an output of an
oracle evaluated is much less than that of input.
In attacks using zeroth-order optimization (ZOO) [9], the
gradient of an output of an oracle (f ) with reference to the
i-th component of an input vector (x¯i), i.e., i-th column vector
of the Jacobian matrix, is explicitly computed using the central
differential formula defined as:
∂f
∂xi
≈
f (x¯+ ǫ · ei)− f (x¯− ǫ · ei)
2ǫ
, (1)
where ei is a unit vector whose i-th component is 1 and ǫ
is a sufficiently small real constant used in the numerical dif-
ferentiation. Therefore, the computational cost of this method
becomes unrealistic if the dimension of input vector becomes
larger. Note that the above differential formula computes
the component of the Jacobian matrix directly, whereas our
method calculates the Jacobian matrix-vector multiplication
instead.
III. ALGORITHM
Consider an oracle of a DNN, which maps a variable vector
of n dimension such as an image of street scape (x ∈ Rn) onto
another variable vector of n dimension such as a segmented
image. In this study, n equals to h · w since images are dealt
with. For simplicity, this mapping is denoted as f(·).
Fig. 1 shows a characteristic of the perturbation generated
in our study. Our primary interest is to seek a perturbation,
which is not attenuated by the function f (·), and potentially
penetrates a DNN within the extent of linearity.
Consider to add a unit perturbation vector x˜ multiplied with
the small coefficient ǫ, to a base image vector x¯. Then, the
function can be expanded with Taylor series as follows:
f (x¯+ ǫx˜) = f (x¯) + ǫJ x˜+O
(
ǫ2
)
, (2)
and
f (x¯− ǫx˜) = f (x¯)− ǫJ x˜+O
(
ǫ2
)
, (3)
where J :=
(
∂f(x)
∂x
)
x=x¯
∈ Rn×n is the Jacobian matrix of
the oracle.
To generate perturbations (vi) such that all the components
inputted in an oracle can be outputted with being multiplied
by a constant, the following relationship must be satisfied:
J vi = λivi, (4)
where λi is the constant (an eigenvalue) and vi is the perturba-
tion (an eigenvector). We assume these eigenvalues are sorted
in descending order based on magnitudes, i.e., the diagonal
components are sorted such that |λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥ . . . ≥ |λn|.
These perturbations are named penetrative perturbation.
By inputting the eigenvector, an output of an oracle is
obtained by modifying (2) as:
f (x¯+ δ · vi) = f (x¯) + δ · λivi +O
(
δ2
)
, (5)
3where ǫ is replaced with δ to distinguish the one used in
numerical differentiation and the other used in adversarial
attacks.
To extract the eigenvalue with the largest magnitude to-
gether with the corresponding eigenvector from J , ARPACK
[12], which is an implementation of the implicitly restarted
Arnoldi method (IRAM), is applied.
In IRAM, same as other eigenvalue problem solvers, a
mapping from x˜ onto J x˜ must be defined. However, as
pointed out in the previous study using the Jacobian matrix
explicitly as an implementation technique for Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [1], the construction of the
Jacobian matrix is time-consuming. To explicitly generate
the Jacobian matrix, multiple evaluations (n + 1 times with
forward difference, and 2n times with central difference) of
the function f (·) is necessary. In this study, we applied the
Fre´chet derivative to reduce the evaluation time by implicitly
forming the Jacobian matrix with the following approximation:
J x˜ =
f (x¯+ ǫ · x˜)− f (x¯− ǫ · x˜)
2ǫ
+O
(
ǫ3
)
. (6)
Note that there is a crucial difference between 6 and (1).
With 6, the mapping from x˜ onto J x˜ can be computed
without knowing the components of the Jacobian matrix. The
algorithm to compute the mapping is given as follows:
Algorithm 1 The Jacobian matrix-vector multiplication
Require: f , x˜, x¯, ǫ
Ensure: J x˜
1: Evaluate a DNN: f+ ← f (x¯+ ǫ · x˜)
2: Evaluate a DNN: f− ← f (x¯− ǫ · x˜)
3: Fre´chet derivative: J x˜← f+−f−2ǫ
4: return J x˜
A typical DNN accepts only a real vector as an input;
hence, the input vector (x˜) must have only real values, which
indicates that an eigenvalue problem solver for symmetric
matrix (e.g., eigsh in SciPy package) is only executable.
Consequently, the algorithm to generate the penetrative per-
turbation with ARPACK is written as follows:
Algorithm 2 Perturbation Generator using ARPACK
Require: f , x¯, ǫ, tol, itmax
Ensure: v1, λ1
1: Prepare linear operator (Algorithm 1)
2: Invoke eigsh with LM option, given the convergence
tolerance (tol), maximum number of Arnoldi iteration
(itmax), and the operator.
One of the eigsh methods defined in SciPy package
accepts the functor in which the Jacobian matrix-vector multi-
plication is defined to compute eigenvalues and corresponding
eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix. With the LM option, the
solver finds the eigenvalues from those with the largest mag-
nitude. Note that the Jacobian matrix of a DNN is generally
non-symmetric; hence, the convergence of eigenvalues may be
affected.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, by only knowing an oracle concerning a
DNN, we performed a numerical experiment to confirm the
applicability of the proposed algorithm and the effectiveness
of the penetrative perturbation. As a target network, a DNN
for segmentation is chosen. Thus, a DNN, in which UNet is
employed as a model, and EfficientNet-b3 is adopted as a
backbone [13], [14], is selected as one of the state-of-the-art
networks to execute semantic segmentation tasks. The network
is trained to segment cars in given images with using Adam
optimizer to minimize the summation of Focal and Dice loss
[14]. The dataset for training and testing the DNN is taken
from CamVid [15], which contains 367 and 233 images for
both training and testing, respectively. The number of output
channel is 1, whereas that of the input channel is 3; hence,
there is a degree of freedom to handle a perturbation input
superimposed on an original image. Therefore, the generated
perturbation is equally inputted to all the input channels, which
potentially affects the convergence of the algorithm. In this
experiment, ǫ, δ are set to 10−4 and 2×10−3 ·n, respectively.
During the iteration procedure using the eigsh, the output
of the oracle, i.e., a segmentation result, is not rounded to
the nearest value. Note that the prediction results shown in
Fig. 3 are rounded to 0 or 1. In this numerical experiment,
n = 184, 320; hence, the number of the oracle evaluation is
368,640 times when one tries to construct the Jacobian matrix
explicitly using (1). The versions of Python and SciPy are set
to 3.6.5 and 1.1.0, respectively.
The eigenvalue with the largest magnitude converged typi-
cally within 2 Arnoldi iterations and with 39 oracle evaluations
on average when tol = 10−12.The real part of eigenvalues
with the largest magnitude out of 233 images is distributed
from -30.5 to 28.3. This means that the magnitude of an input
perturbation can be magnified 30 times approximately, and
appears in an output. The eigenvector corresponding to the
eigenvalue with the largest magnitude extracted is superim-
posed on the input vector, and the segmentation is executed.
Fig. 3 shows the result. Although the perturbation added is
little to avoid contaminating the original image globally, the
segmented image significantly collapsed, and most portion
ought to be recognized as cars are recognized as void.
To quantitatively evaluate the performances of the pro-
posed method, we conducted statistical analysis. Moreover,
we generated perturbed images with uniformly distributed
random noise of the same magnitude, and performed semantic
segmentation.
To evaluate the similarity between an original image and an
adversarial image, we selected Structural SIMilarity (SSIM)
index [16]. Also, to evaluate the performance of the segmen-
tation, we adopted the Dice coefficient.
Table II shows the statistical results obtained. The mean
values of SSIM with the penetrative perturbation are higher
compared to uniformly distributed random noise. The differ-
ence shows, irrespective of the same magnitude, the pene-
trative perturbation is less likely to destroy the structure of
images than using uniformly distributed random perturbations.
The mean values of the Dice coefficient with the penetrative
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Fig. 3. Segmentation result; (a) original image inputted to the DNN,
(b) ground truth of the segmented image, (c) perturbation to be added to
the original image, (d) prediction result for the original image, (e) linear
combination of the original image and the perturbation (adversarial image),
and (f) prediction result for the adversarial image.
TABLE II
EFFECTS OF PENETRATIVE PERTURBATION AGAINST EFFICIENTNET-B3.
MEAN VALUES OF SSIM AND DICE COEFFICIENT ARE SHOWN WITH
VARIANCES INDICATED WITHIN BRACKETS.
SSIM Dice
Uniform 0.106 (0.00220) 0.829 (0.0489)
Penetrative (tol = 10−3) 0.861 (0.0325) 0.254 (0.110)
Penetrative (tol = 10−6) 0.861 (0.0325) 0.259 (0.109)
Penetrative (tol = 10−12) 0.860 (0.0332) 0.251 (0.110)
perturbation are less than half compared with uniform per-
turbation. Moreover, variances of Dice coefficient with the
penetrative perturbation are approximately twice compared
the other perturbation. Consequently, the uniformly distributed
random perturbations constantly fail to deceive the DNN,
whereas the penetrative perturbation can deceive the DNN
with higher uncertainty. Additionally, setting the convergence
tolerance to 10−3 could affect the results slightly.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Distribution characteristics of the perturbation
The perturbation generated is mainly distributed around
target objects to be segmented. Hence, the proposed algorithm
has a mechanism to make object boundary obscure or accented
for the DNN to induce mis-segmentation.
TABLE III
EFFECTS OF PENETRATIVE PERTURBATION AGAINST EFFICIENTNETS. THE
MEAN VALUES OF SSIM AND DICE COEFFICIENT ARE SHOWN WITH
VARIANCES INDICATED WITHIN BRACKETS.
SSIM Dice
Uniform (B0) 0.106 (0.00220) 0.747 (0.0766)
Penetrative (B0, tol = 10−12) 0.870 (0.0205) 0.436 (0.108)
Uniform (B1) 0.106 (0.00220) 0.829 (0.0410)
Penetrative (B1, tol = 10−12) 0.869 (0.0276) 0.343 (0.0764)
Uniform (B2) 0.106 (0.00220) 0.797 (0.0571)
Penetrative (B2, tol = 10−12) 0.872 (0.0223) 0.250 (0.0473)
Uniform (B3) 0.106 (0.00220) 0.829 (0.0489)
Penetrative (B3, tol = 10−12) 0.861 (0.0325) 0.254 (0.110)
Uniform (B4) 0.106 (0.00220) 0.823 (0.0497)
Penetrative (B4, tol = 10−12) 0.870 (0.0183) 0.326 (0.0981)
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Fig. 4. Correlation between the real part of eigenvalue and SSIM index.
There is a possibility that the characteristics of the perturba-
tion are affected depending on tasks built upon different DNN
architecture and dataset. Hence, we investigated the effects of
the penetrative perturbation against different EfficientNets, as
shown in Table III. The DNNs are constantly deceived accord-
ing to the Dice coefficients with the penetrative perturbation
compared with uniformly distributed noise.
B. Limitation of the perturbation
Fig. 4 shows the correlation between the real part of
eigenvalues with the largest magnitude and the SSIM indices
for each of the test images. There is a tendency that the SSIM
index corresponding to eigenvalues with a magnitude less than
2, approximately, is lower among the others. Therefore, there is
a certain image set with which the DNN is not deceived using
the penetrative perturbation without significantly modifying an
original image.
C. Non-linearity effects for the perturbation
From (5), the superimposed penetrative perturbation appears
on the base output vector as it is within the extent of linearity.
In this study, the unit eigenvector computed, is multiplied
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Fig. 5. Eigenvectors extracted; (a) the eigenvector corresponding with the
eigenvalue with the largest magnitude (λ = −14.5), (b) with the second
largest magnitude (λ = −11.7), (c) with the third largest magnitude (λ =
−10.2), (d) with the fourth largest magnitude (λ = 9.53), (e) with the 10th
largest magnitude (λ = −6.87), (f) with the 20th largest magnitude (λ =
−5.62).
by a constant δ, so that the perturbation can have significant
effects in the segmentation task. As discussed in Fig. 3, the
perturbation does not appear on the output as it is. The first
reason for this is that the linearity of the perturbation is not
guaranteed with the parameter (δ = 2.0 × 10−3 · n). The
other possible reason is that the sigmoid activation functions
deployed in the output layer could limit the output.
D. Behavior of higher eigenvectors
To simplify the problem, we assume real values for all the
eigenvalues. Based on our earlier formulation, eigenvectors
corresponding with the eigenvalues with the second largest
magnitude or higher have less impact as an adversarial pertur-
bation due to (5). However, the behavior of such higher eigen-
vectors over semantic segmentation is not apparent. Therefore,
the higher eigenvectors are extracted and the same analysis as
in Section IV is conducted.
Fig. 5 shows the visualization result of the higher eigen-
vectors, and the result of the statistical analysis is shown
in Table IV. As stated earlier in our numerical experiment,
n = 184, 320; the 20th eigenvector is still considered predom-
inant, among others. The perturbation expressed with higher
eigenvectors is distributed around an object to be segmented,
TABLE IV
EFFECTS OF HIGHER PENETRATIVE PERTURBATION AGAINST
EFFICIENTNET-B3. MEAN VALUES OF SSIM AND DICE COEFFICIENT ARE
SHOWN WITH VARIANCES INDICATED WITHIN BRACKETS. ALL THE
COMPUTATION IS CONDUCTED WITH tol = 10−12 .
SSIM Dice
Penetrative (1st) 0.860 (0.0332) 0.251 (0.110)
Penetrative (2nd) 0.838 (0.0366) 0.201 (0.0875)
Penetrative (3rd) 0.822 (0.0369) 0.145 (0.0581)
Penetrative (4th) 0.799 (0.0406) 0.129 (0.0491)
Penetrative (10th) 0.707 (0.0578) 0.109 (0.0435)
Penetrative (20th) 0.590 (0.0704) 0.0949 (0.0387)
and this is the same tendency as that of the first eigenvector.
Moreover, the perturbation based on a higher eigenvector
can destroy original images and segmentation results more
significantly than those of the first eigenmode vector according
to the SSIM and Dice coefficient as shown in Table IV.
Finally, it is possible to blend these eigenvectors linearly
in order not to give unusual impact on human eyes with
adversarial characteristics being kept as follows:
x˜ =
M∑
i=1
aivi, (7)
where ai ∈ R is a constant arbitrary chosen, and M is the
number of the predominant eigenvectors taken.
E. Existence of complex eigenvalues and eigenvectors
All the eigenvalues are real numbers if the Jacobian ma-
trix is symmetric. In realistic DNNs, in general, the matrix
takes non-symmetric form. Therefore, a complex eigenvalue
is potentially selected as λ1 if one strictly solves the system.
However, with a DNN where an oracle evaluation is only
permitted, it is realistic to assume that it is not allowed to add
complex perturbation on an original vector such as an image.
Practically, it is possible to approximately solve the eigenvalue
problem for the non-symmetric Jacobian matrix, as presented
in this study.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We proposed a method to compute the penetrative pertur-
bation based on ARPACK as an eigenvalue problem solver
and Fre´chet derivative as a generator of the Jacobian matrix-
vector product. The method proves a smaller number of query
trials and fewer memory requirements among other black-
box attack algorithms. From numerical evaluation, with this
perturbation, one of the state-of-the-art DNNs, with which
high-performance segmentation is possible, can be deceived
with the realistic number of query trials.
In future works, we expect to achieve the following: (i)
to establish a method to systematically detect the penetrative
perturbations introduced in our study as a defender and (ii)
to reveal how the penetrative perturbation propagates inside a
DNN with considering nonlinear factors.
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